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The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Balancing Public Safety and Civil Liberties
I. Background
Society is rapidly changing, and so too must public health safety laws. Most current state
public health emergency laws date back to the early 20 th century and are largely based on outdated
scientific principles. New diseases and threats must be accounted for, biotoxins are easily
weaponized, novel strains of viruses have emerged, and advances in technology and healthcare
must be considered when planning for future emergencies. 1
The states have the ultimate authority to regulate public health safety through the state
police powers, but the federal government has become increasingly involved. 2 Although lacking
express authority, the federal government can and does influence public health policy via its
spending and commerce powers. Through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
a federal agency that aims to protect against public health threats, the federal government has taken
a leadership role in the reform of public health preparedness. 3 The CDC, in collaboration with
health law scholars from Johns Hopkins University and Georgetown University, drafted “The
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act” (from here on, the “Model Act”) in 2001 as a
nonbinding blueprint for the states to follow when revising their public health emergency laws. 4
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The Model Act’s drafting was motivated by the 9/11 terrorist attacks, SARS outbreak, and
anthrax scare, which alerted lawmakers to holes in the public health infrastructure. Republicans
feared the United States’ public health safety infrastructure was inadequate to deal with future
emergencies. The state of public health emergency law has been regarded as “a house of cards that
could crumble at any moment.”5 Many feel the state health authorities still lack the authority and
flexibility to adequately deal with new threats, and so the Model Act gained popularity. 6
Lawrence Gostin, public health law scholar and the Model Act’s leading author, has
identified four purposes for the Model Act. First, the Model Act recognizes a need for modernized
response procedures to modern health threats. 7 No longer should obsolete diseases like polio and
smallpox be the focus of health emergency preparedness. New medical treatments have developed
to fight and contain illnesses, and less restrictive means of achieving public health goals are
available. Even the human immune system has evolved. Older state laws may not take into account
contemporary understandings of certain diseases, or the medical treatments available to deal with
those diseases.8 Second, the Model Act aims to standardize the emergency procedures among the
states. Lack of uniformity could hinder needed coordination between the states. Emergencies
demand the sharing of personnel and resources. Inconsistencies between state laws has also
exacerbated the damage of past epidemics. For example, during the H1N1 “Swine Flu” Epidemic
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in 2009, differing patient reporting requirements between states allowed for unidentified infections
to spill over into neighboring states, frustrating the ability of state and local authorities to contain
the virus. Third, the Model Act encourages states to adopt a public health preparedness framework
that is consistent with modern ethical, legal and constitutional norms. 9 The legal and constitutional
landscape is changing; health privacy, antidiscrimination, disability protection, and other modern
developments must be factored into a modern public health preparedness laws. Fourth, the Model
Act clarifies the roles of state authorities, private healthcare actors and individuals in the event of
a potential public health emergency. 10 By preparing authorities for what they can and cannot do,
and putting the public on notice as to what may be expected or required of them, the Model Act
purports to safeguard civil rights and due process. 11
Transparency is necessary for an ethical, legal and effective public health emergency plan.
At a 2001 conference on “State Emergency Health Powers and the Bioterrorism Threat,”
academics, lawyers and government officials emphasized the importance of a transparent and
lawful governmental response to health emergencies.12 Not only is transparency necessary to
preserve our national virtues and commitment to justice at all times, but it will also allow for a
more effective relationship between authorities and individuals by reducing the risk of public
distrust and noncompliance. Public Trust is essential to an effective public health preparedness
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plan. A public health framework must balance the need for strong emergency powers and the
protection of individual liberties to foster public trust. Without public trust, compliance will
diminish and so too will the efficacy of government measures to fight health threats. 13 “Free
people respond to leadership much more vigorously than a people held in place by power, fear and
terror of their own government.”14 Excessive governmental coercion will not yield compliance. If
the government is too forceful, people will not see the actions they are taking as beneficial (because
why would they be if they require this much force) and compliance with safety measures will be
stunted. For example, if mandatory testing will be followed by excessive penalties or
imprisonment, people will not get tested and cases of virulent illnesses will go undetected. On the
other hand, the government needs sufficient tools to fight time sensitive emergencies. Therefore,
an effective preparedness plan allows authorities to act quickly and confidently while also
respecting civil liberties. The constitution must bend in the face of emergencies, but only so far
until compliance is lost. Public health law experts stress the importance of the individual actions
of US citizens in preventing or maintaining the spread of contagious diseases. 15 Authorities must
obtain public trust to ensure coordination and cooperation with emergency procedures.
Under the Model Act, the circumstances that justify compulsory government action are
broad and raise constitutional issues as to when these government actions are justified and whether
the extent and scope of these compulsory government actions comply with Due Process. The
Model Act grants broad authority to state authorities. It establishes provisions for reporting cases
of certain diseases and other identifies conditions that can trigger the declaration of a public
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emergency. The Model Act identifies circumstances that allow state governors to unilaterally
declare a state of emergency, and that trigger compulsory government action including mandatory
testing, treatment, quarantine and isolation.16
Does the Model Act properly balance the need for flexible governmental authority and the
protection of civil liberties? The Model Act is promising and reflects the urgent need for updates
in our public health framework. The federal government’s use of a model act to align the states’
public health infrastructures promises to solve some glaring inadequacies in current state laws.
The nature of a public health emergency is unique in that it demands coordination and transparency
between authorities, private healthcare actors, and individuals.
Although a solid foundation for which states can use to improve and modernize their public
health infrastructures, the Model Act is overbroad in its emergency powers and does not properly
balance civil liberty protections. A standardized response procedure for epidemics and
bioterrorism is necessary to protect the public; however, extensive critique and identification of
legal/ethical issues must take place before these procedures become effective as law. I will show
how the states have received the recommendations of the Model Act by looking at which
provisions have been adopted into state law, and which provisions have been left behind. I will
also use secondary sources, and apply constitutional standards to these specific provisions. Despite
the lack of available checks on executive authority, and even if the courts are truly unwilling to
uphold and defend the constitution in times of emergencies, a comprehensive illustration of the
roles and obligations of authorities and health actors in the event of potential emergencies is
necessary not only from a legal and ethical standpoint, but also from an efficacy standpoint. But,
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were the government to be free to violate the constitution on every alarm of danger, public trust
would diminish accordingly, and compliance will be stunted. 17 My recommendation will identify
which, if any, of the key Model Act provisions should be included in the future redrafting of the
Model Act and how the provisions can be modified.
III. Analysis
Because the Model Act was designed for adoption into state law, a look at whether the
states have actually adopted these provisions is an important indicator of the Model Act’s success
(or lack of). As of August 1, 2011, 40 states have incorporated a version of the Model Act’s
provisions into state law.18 However, only 28 states have adopted the Reporting Provision, 22
states have adopted the Declaration Provision, and 18 states have adopted the Medical Treatment
Provision.19 This analysis will focus on the provisions above, discuss policy arguments, apply
constitutional standards, and offer recommendations.
(A) The Reporting Provision
Sections 301 and 303 of the Model Act places a duty on healthcare workers to collect and
report potential health emergencies to the respective authorities. 20 Section 301 identifies what
triggers a healthcare worker’s obligation to report a case to health authorities and what must be in
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those reports.21 Section 303 discusses information sharing after those reports are given to health
authorities, regarding who the health authorities can share that information with. 22
Section 301 Reporting.
a) Illness or health condition. A healthcare provider, coroner, or medical examiner shall report
all cases of persons who harbor any illness or health condition that may be potential causes
of a public health emergency.
b) Pharmacists. In addition to the foregoing requirements for health care providers, a
pharmacist shall report any unusual or increased prescription rates, unusual types of
prescriptions or unusual trends in pharmacy visits that may be potential causes of a public
health emergency. Prescription related events that require a report include, but are not
limited to
a. An unusual increase in the number of prescriptions or over the counter
pharmaceuticals to treat conditions that the public health authority identifies
through regulations;
b. An unusual increase in the number of prescriptions for antibiotics; and
c. Any prescription that treats a disease that is relatively uncommon or may be
associated with bioterrorism.23
Section 303 Information Sharing.
a) Whenever the public safety authority or other state or local government agency learns of a
case of a reportable illness or health condition, an unusual cluster, or suspicious event that
may be the cause of a public health emergency, it shall immediately notify the public health
authority.
b) Whenever the public authority learns of a case of a reportable illness or health condition,
an unusual cluster, or a suspicious event that it reasonably believes has the potential to be
caused by bioterrorism, it shall immediately notify the public safety authority, tribal
authorities, and federal health and public safety authorities.
c) Sharing of information on reportable illnesses, health conditions, unusual clusters, or
suspicious events between public health and safety authorities shall be restricted to the
information necessary for the treatment, control, investigation, and prevention of a public
health emergency.24
The Model Act represents a growing and critical effort to standardize the reporting and
surveillance system of infectious disease in the United States. The collection of health data is
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essential for state health authorities to “identify health risks, inform the public and intervene to
prevent the spread of disease.”25 The reporting provision furthers the purpose of the Model Act
mentioned earlier to standardize laws between states. Inconsistent state laws have a dramatic effect
in the reporting context because it prevents the state and federal government from understanding
where the infectious conditions are most prevalent, how to allocate resources accordingly, and
what steps to take to prevent or mitigate the spread of the disease.
For example, some states have required patients with positive blood samples for
Salmonella be reported to the state authorities, while others only required such reporting as to
Salmonella when the patient is symptomatic or shows sign of illness. 26 Patients infected by
Salmonella are still contagious but may report symptoms months after exposure, or may not show
symptoms at all.27 The data produced was misleading because government authorities were not
able to identify trends in the infection as to time and place. A patient infected with Salmonella is
still contagious even if the patient experiences no symptoms, and the patient could be spreading
the disease to local communities without evidence of the infection on record. Without data of all
the infectious cases, local authorities were unable to isolate the disease or provide resources or
information to local medical partnerships in preparation for a potential introduction of the
contagious bacterial infection. This also prevented federal and state governments from
understanding the gravity of the salmonella infection, and from allocating resources to
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communities or regions that would need it the most.28 With differing standards as to what
information must reach public health authorities, cases of novel or uncontrolled diseases can go
undetected between state borders. If all states are on the same page with respect to what conditions
are reportable and available to authorities, states will be able to communicate and coordinate,
identify contagious health risks earlier, and prevent undetected cases from entering their borders
and infecting their population. Reporting is also important because it enables to the government to
assess the success of certain disease prevention and response efforts. If one state does not report
cases of infections and only reports when a patient is symptomatic, authorities will be unable to
analyze the effectiveness of certain response strategies.
However, while the law must allow for the spread of this crucial information, protecting
against unnecessary disclosure is also critical form a policy and legal standpoint. Health data is
very personal, and can have major effects on someone’s life if publicized without permission. 29
From a policy standpoint, if people don’t trust their health information to remain private, they may
avoid examination or treatment.30
The Model Act is a good starting point but does not sufficiently limit what information
must be reported, and who can access that information. In light of the massive changes in health
privacy protections, the Model Act’s reporting provisions raise constitutional problems. On its
face, the Model Act imposes no “reasonable belief” requirement or an informed consent
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requirement.31 Healthcare providers are expected to immediately report any cases that “may be” a
potential cause of a public health emergency. 32 Healthcare providers are required to report their
patient’s information based on their subjective belief of what “may” cause a public health
emergency. The statute goes no further to give healthcare providers guidance as to when disclosure
of confidential patient information is appropriate as to safeguard patient confidentiality. Rather,
Section 301(a) uses broad language that a “healthcare provider . . . shall” report “all cases” that
could potentially trigger an emergency. 33 Such broad language will cause doctors to err on the side
of reporting more than is necessary. Under 301, pharmacists are put in an odd position to determine
what might equate to a public health emergency, a definition for which the statute itself provides
little clarity. A simple increase in drug prescriptions or antibiotics may trigger the reporting
requirements. Furthermore, any “unusual increase in prescription” activity triggers a duty to report,
giving pharmacists discretion to report almost anything with little guidance or limitations. 34 Even
more problematic is the contents of these reports after a duty to report is triggered, sweeping in
nearly everything identifiable about the patient involved: name, date of birth, race, occupation, and
“any other information needed to locate the patient.”35 The contents of these reports are hardly
limited.
Section 303 is slightly different because it involves information sharing between
authorities, rather than information sharing from healthcare provider to health authorities. Section
303 requires public health authorities and public safety authorities” exchange all relevant
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information.”36 Once a reportable case reaches the health authorities, that report is immediately
disclosed to every state authority involved, health or safety. Section 303’s only limit as to what
information can be shared between authorities is that the “sharing of information . . . shall be
restricted to the information necessary for the treatment, control, investigation, and prevention of
a ‘public health emergency’”.37
In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court ruled that mandatory medical reporting for public
safety is constitutional only if sufficient safeguards of patient privacy are in place to limit both
who can access the information, and what information can be reported without the patient’s
permission.38 The expectation of privacy must be balanced against the safety of the community. 39
The Court upheld a New York statute requiring the state keep a centralized computer database
containing the names and addresses of all persons prescribed a specified list of controlled
substances. Justice Brennan, in his concurrence, explained that the reports were only available to
a small number of persons within the state health authority, and that “broad dissemination” of that
information would violate the constitutionally protected privacy rights unless there exists a
“compelling state interest” for doing so.40 The majority also emphasized the extensive safeguards
employed in Whalen to uphold the statute, noting that access to the database of computer
information was limited and only accessible to authorities outside the health authority when an
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investigation is launched, giving the state authorities probable cause to furnish the reports
contained in the database.41
The Reporting Provision does not comport with the constitutional standard of privacy set
forth in Whalen. The Model Act is distinguishable from the statute in Whalen. In Whalen, all
mandatory medical reports were to be destroyed after 5 years and contained only names, ages, and
addresses, and access to the reports was confined to a limited number of health department
personnel.42 Unlike the statute in Whalen, the Model Act contains hardly any safeguards on either
who has access to sensitive information, and what information is available. The electronic database
in Whalen automatically deleted the data of a patient five years after it was collected. 43 Under the
Model Act, there is no time limit or time constraint on the retention of these medical records, nor
are there even any procedures as to how the medical records shall be managed within the database
to maintain some degree of privacy protection. In Whalen, the electronic database was protected
both by programming safety codes and physical protection of the database hardware. 44 Not only
did the statute upheld in Whalen adequately limit how and when sensitive health information can
be collected and stored, but it also limited when sensitive health information can be shared after
it is collected.45 The majority in Whalen noted that investigatory authorities, or other authorities
outside the health authority, were only allowed access to the database after an investigation was
launched involving a particular patient included in the database. 46 On the contrary, the Section 303
of the Model Act allows the sharing of information between all authorities immediately, without
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cause, reasonable belief, or following an investigation.47 Where in Whalen the reports were limited
to specific personnel within the health authority, the Model Act would require immediate
dissemination to state and federal safety authorities under Section 303. 48 The Model Act
encompasses the kind of broad dissemination of private health data that Justice Brennan warned
about in his concurrence.
The reports under the Model Act sweep in a lot more than just name and address, including
race, occupation, and any information needed to locate the patient. 49 The list of reportable illnesses
and patient information that will be collected under the provisions is massive.
The reports are not narrowly tailored to protect against unnecessary disclosures because
the reporting provisions do not need to be triggered by an emergency declaration and would be
effective immediately if adopted into state law.50 Certainly, in the face of an emergency, broader
dissemination of critical health data will be justified as the safety interest of the community
increases. However, to require healthcare providers furnish these reports based on their subjective
belief of what may be the cause of a future public health emergency, and without limits as to how
far that information can go after it is furnished, would allow for the widespread violation of the
Whalen constitutional standard of privacy. It is not farfetched to say that millions of cases will be
reported unnecessarily, in scenarios where potential health emergencies are feared but never
actually occur. The Model Act should least insure that if the broad reporting provisions are to be
effective as law, they must be justified in the first instance by requiring a heightened standard for
when a healthcare provider should furnish a report to the state health authorities. The Model Act
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should also provide more guidelines as to how the information should be stored and maintained
once it reaches the health authority, and more guidelines or limits as to when the health authorities
may be authorized to share those reports with investigatory or safety authorities. Section 303’s
information sharing provision should at least be effective only after the governor has declared a
state of emergency, as to prevent potentially harmful disclosures from reaching inappropriate
hands.
Daniel Reich suggests a “two step” approach to the compulsory reporting requirements to
bring the provision within constitutional bounds.51 This would involve unique numeric identifiers
of initial reports as between healthcare providers and patients under Section 301. If the health
authorities identify a case that could cause a public health emergency, they can request the rest of
the information from the provider with probable cause. 52 This approach would both add an
additional safeguard to privacy protection, while also transferring the duty to determine what “may
be” a public health emergency from the healthcare providers to the health authorities, who are
more qualified to make such determinations. This approach also seems consistent with the
approach in Whalen, where investigatory authorities could only reach the information within the
database once a criminal investigation was underway. 53
(B) The Declaration Provision
Under the Model Act, state governors are given nearly exclusive authority to decide the
timing and duration of a state of emergency. A large minority of states (22) have adopted the
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declaration provision into state law.54 Sections 403 of the Model Act authorizes state governors to
declare a state of emergency either in the event of a bioterrorist attack or upon discovery of a
particularly virulent virus or disease, when either poses a “high probability” of leading to a large
number of deaths, serious disability, or exposure to infectious agents. 55 Once declared, the state
governor is empowered to suspend statutory provisions regulating the conduct of state business,
when strict compliance would “prevent, hinder, or delay necessary action,” utilize all available
state and local resources “as reasonably necessary to respond to the emergency”, and mobilize the
militia.56 Consultation with health or other experts is not required before a declaration when the
“situation calls for prompt and timely action.” 57 Governors can unilaterally extend the state of
emergency (that is, without legislative approval) under Section 405, so long as the above standard
continues to apply to the circumstances. 58
Section 403’s “high probability” standard is too deferential and strays from the federal
standard for lawful declaration of a state of emergency. This provision’s only legal check on the
governor’s actions is found in Section 405(c), providing that state legislatures may terminate the
state of emergency, by majority vote in both chambers, if Section 403’s “high probability standard”
no longer applies to the state’s circumstances. 59 In its current form, the declaration provision does
not require any legislative involvement in the ongoing regulation of a public health emergency.
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Civil liberties must give way in the face of emergencies, and government actors need some
of the flexibility the Model Act promises to deal with time sensitive problems. Lawrence Gostin
explains that because the Model Act is designed to prepare for unanticipated threats, Section 403
and 405’s broad language and deferential executive standards are justified. 60 However, a
constitutionally sound emergency plan must mot grant the government an unfettered license to
violate civil liberties.
The Model Act’s Declaration Provision must be modified to avoid public distrust.
Declaration of a state of emergency is a massive executive power, and has often been employed
abusively.61 The public is already suspicious of executive power and overreach. The Model Act’s
Declaration Provision opens the door for abuse because it triggers most of the Model Acts
compulsory powers. The ACLU is particularly concerned with the Model Act’s declaration
provision and its potential for abuse of vulnerable populations, fearing majoritarian executives will
neglect the needs of religious groups, minorities, etc.62 The ACLU also expresses concern with the
executive’s unchecked authority to declare a state of emergency without judicial oversight. 63
Executive authority under the Constitution is at its highest during emergency conflicts involving
other countries. Judicial oversight can impede the need for a coordinated and singular response to
international crises, and so the courts have historically yielded to executive authority in times of
international and wartime emergencies. International issues like war are more political and so less
legislative or judicial oversight in executive actions is appropriate. Individual rights are less
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implicated, as issues bear more on our representations and interactions with outsiders. Although
the legislature and judiciary’s ability to check executive authority in the context of wartime
emergencies is limited, the same justification does not apply to public health emergencies.
Bioterrorism is an act of war, but the Model Act goes way beyond that to cover naturally occurring
threats of disease and illness. The Model Act applies to situations outside of bioterrorism and
foreign policy and therefore, the Model Act should incorporate more judicial and legislative
oversight to comply with our system of checks and balances. George Annas criticizes the Model
Act as an invasion of states’ rights and a violation of constitutional federalism. 64 Although the Act
was originally designed to address threats in bioterrorism, which is within the purview of federal
jurisdiction, it goes way beyond biological warfare and covers all threats of infectious or virulent
illnesses.65 Judicial and legislative oversight might not be realistic in the event of a real emergency,
but nonetheless a statute with such wide government authority over individual rights (and not
political determinations) should incorporate as much involvement from the other branches of
government.
At the minimum, the Model Act should contain the same legislative checks that the federal
government has in the context of war emergencies.66 The War Powers Act contains substantially
more safeguards against executive abuse than the Model Act. In order to extend a war time
emergency, the War Powers Act requires the executive consult with Congress at every possible
instance and report periodically.67 The Model Act does not require state governors report to or
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consult with state legislators. More importantly, the War Powers Act requires bicameral
Congressional approval if the President’s state of war declaration is to extend beyond sixty days. 68
As for natural disasters and state of emergencies, 50 U.S.C. § 1622(b) requires both the House and
Senate issue a joint resolution before a state of emergency can exceed 6 months. 69 Under the Model
Act, the legislature can terminate a state of emergency after the initial period through bicameral
approval, but never is the legislature required to convene and address whether a state of emergency
should continue or not. This provision encourages state legislators take a backseat once a potential
health emergency arises.
Just as substantial legislative checks are in place in the contexts of war and natural disasters,
the states should similarly impose more legislative oversight on executive authority before
adopting the Model Act’s Declaration Provision. Legislative involvement is important because it
provides the public an opportunity to voice their concerns and interests through elected officials,
whereas the executive branch is more so insulated. Protecting individual rights in the healthcare
context is crucial because personal issues are implicated, such as the right to confidential medical
information, the right to health, and the right to bodily integrity. The legislature is somewhat
bipartisan and encompasses more opinions and viewpoints of the community, whereas the interests
of the executive are more closely aligned with whoever is in power. Democratic accountability is
a powerful check on government action and should not be taken lightly in this context where the
liberties at stake are so high. Legislators want to be reelected and are therefore more accountable
to the public. The legislature forms their ideas from a wider range of people and opinions, and
respond to interest groups. The more democratic approach would be to require legislative approval.
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Section 104 of the Model Act defines a public health emergency as an occurrence of
imminent threat of an illness or health condition that is believed to be caused by bioterrorism or
the appearance of a novel or previously controlled or eradicated infectious agent or biological
toxin, and poses a high probability of an of the following harms: a large number of deaths in the
affected population; a large number of serious or long term disabilities in the affected population;
or widespread exposure to an infectious or toxic agent that poses a significant risk of substantial
future harm to a large number of people in the affected population. 70
Section 104 raises constitutional problems because the subjective, “is believed to be
caused” standard in 104(m)(a) does not safeguard against arbitrary or unnecessary declarations. 71
State executives can find and declare a public health emergency based on their subjective belief of
an appearance of a novel or “previously controlled” strain or bioterrorist attack. The “high
probability” standard is also vague and lacks any real limitation. In conjunction with Section 403
above, the state executives do not even need to consult with health or medical experts if the
situation calls for prompt and timely action.72 It is unclear why the Model Act’s drafters did not
include at least an objective, “reasonable belief” standard in this Section. Without an objective
standard or a legislative check, state executives are given almost unlimited discretion to declare a
state of emergency. Section 104’s definition sweeps in more than is necessary. Influenza is a smart
virus that adapts and mutates every year to bypass the human immune system, and vaccine
companies race to develop new vaccines to immunize against those specific strains. Based on the
language of the Model Act, because seasonal influenza sometimes appears as “a previously
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controlled . . . infectious agent” that might pose a “high probability of widespread
exposure/substantial future harm”, the governor would arguably be able to declare a state of
emergency every flu season, without any political backlash. “Significant risk of substantial future
harm” to “a large number of people” seems to sweep in novel influenza strains as well, which
appear once every ten years. Although this might be a stretch of the standard, the standard is too
broad and needs more specificity. State legislators of the Model Act should be more specific as to
what can trigger a public health emergency. The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons
has deemed the Model Act “a prescription for tyranny.” 73 The organization notes the expanded
ability of the state to act as medical providers in the event of emergency. The state authorities
would be unrestricted in their ability to treat anyone who has been exposed to the disease. Meaning,
they could treat persons ill from any cause and unrelated to the specific condition that caused the
emergency. Moreover, the association is concerned with the Model Act’s definition of “public
health emergency” and what may trigger the compulsory powers mentioned above. 74
(C) The Medical Treatment and Testing Provisions
Under Sections 602 and 603, the Model Act empowers state authorities, during a state of
public health emergency, to arrest, imprison and forcibly examine, vaccinate and medicate citizens
without consent MSEHPSA §§ 602 and 603. But, under sections 603(a) and (b)(3), persons can
refuse treatment or vaccination and remain isolated instead. 75 Authorities acting under these
provisions will not be held liable for injuries caused, so long as state’s actions are “not reasonably
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likely to lead to serious harm” and no willful malice. MSEHPSA § 804. Only a slim minority of
states (18) have adopted Sections 602 and 603 into state law. 76
Opponents of the Model Act’s medical treatment and testing provisions are concerned with
the Model Act’s imposing of criminal penalties for noncompliance. George Annas, an outspoken
opponent of the Model Act, questions both the utility of the Model Act and the Model Act’s failure
to properly safeguard civil liberties. Annas explains that the Model Act is “more appropriate for
the United States of the 19th century than for the United States of the 20th century.”77 Annas argues
that all persons have a constitution right to refuse medical treatment today, and to be forcibly
isolated “at the whim” of a public health official for refusing treatment is a violation of that right.
Annas concludes that the Model Act is likely to undermine public trust, and will not effectuate its
purpose in protecting the public through strict compliance with mandatory measures. 78 He argues
that there is no precedent for requiring treatment of patients against their will under criminal
penalties.79
However, criminal penalties have been upheld for an individual’s refusal to undergo
mandatory state medical treatment. In Jacobsen, the Supreme Court upheld the 5$ penalty and
misdemeanour for those who refused to undergo mandatory vaccination. Similarly, the extent of
criminal sanctions under the Model Act is limited to a misdemeanour. The Supreme Court of the
United States recognized that the Constitution does not provide an absolute right to be free from
all restraint. In Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts mandatory
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smallpox vaccination regulation as a constitutional exercise of the state police powers. Justice
Harlan’s opinion can be seen as imposing four constitutional requirements on state mandated
medical procedures: public health necessity; reasonable means; proportionality; and avoidable
harm. To be constitutional, the mandatory state regulation must be in furtherance of a public health
necessity, must have a “real and substantial” relation between the necessity and the means
employed, must impose penalties proportional to the harm of noncompliance, and must not be
exercised in an “arbitrary, unreasonable manner or go beyond what is reasonably required for the
safety of the public.”80 The Court held that a mandatory smallpox vaccination, enforced through a
$5 penalty for noncompliance, was necessary for the “speedy extermination” of the communicable
disease. Smallpox was, to an extent, still prevalent in some Massachusetts cities. The Court found
the regulations were not unreasonable, considering the proportion of the $5 penalty to the harm of
compromising the communal immunity, and were not likely to be exercised arbitrarily because the
decisions to vaccinate were required to first be approved by the independent local medical board
and could be exempted.81
Jacobsen emphasized the use of the board of health to make medical appropriateness
decisions to protect against the arbitrary use of compulsory government power and the potential
for government abuse.82 The local board of health was comprised of independent physicians,
employed strictly to decide whether forced medical treatment would or would not be appropriate
in any particular case. The New York statute also made medical exemptions available. In Jacobsen,
both the healthcare providers and health authorities operating under the statute were held to their
ordinary standard of care as healthcare providers. With the protection of the healthcare provider’s
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standard of care and an independent determination of medical appropriateness, the Jacobsen statute
comported with the constitution because it did not enable the “arbitrary and oppressive” use of
government power.83
The Model Act’s mandatory treatment and testing provisions are not punitive when
considered in light of the quarantine and isolation powers. The Model Act’s medical treatment and
testing provisions work in conjunction with the quarantine and isolation provision and with the
immunity provision. Under the Model Act, anyone who refuses to undergo medical examination
or treatment can be forcibly quarantined. Critics of the Model Act argue that a lack of alternatives
to mandatory testing as constitutionally problematic, despite the Model Act’s promise to uphold
and protect individual rights to the fullest.84 Daniel Reich challenges the constitutionality of the
medical treatment provision when used with the quarantine and isolation powers in Section 602 of
the Model Act. He argues that civil confinement is defendable from a Due Process challenge only
as a public safety measure through the state police powers, but not as a punitive measure. Reich
argues that the confinement power will be exercised as a punitive measure because it will be
enforced against persons who object to the mandatory treatment or testing efforts. Reich states that
“the presumption that individuals or groups refusing vaccination, treatment, testing or examination
should be subject to quarantine and isolation leads to the problematic potential abuse of quarantine
and isolation as a mechanism for enforcing compulsory public health measures.” 85 Reich explains
that to confine an individual for refusing to undergo treatment or testing, rather than confining the
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individual for being ill or being exposed to a contagious disease, is a punitive measure to enforce
the other provisions of the statute, rather than to further public safety. 86
However, this fear does not mean that mandatory isolation and quarantine measures would
be punitive. Public safety can justify the containment of those who have a contagious condition or
have shown signs of having a condition dangerous to the community as seen in Jacobsen.
Individuals who refuse to undergo mandatory testing or treatment, at the time when a public health
emergency is declared, have posed a risk to their community by refusing to undergo treatment or
testing to prove they are otherwise safe. Considering a public health emergency is only triggered
when virulent diseases are widespread and pose a high risk to the community, almost all
individuals in the community can be said to pose a risk to the community unless proven otherwise.
In the event of fast spreading diseases, individuals should allow authorities to identify whether
they threaten the community. To refuse treatment or even testing altogether prevents authorities
from getting crucial information to determine whether an individual is safe or might compromise
the safety of his community, which does pose a threat to the safety of the public. The Model Act
requires the least restrictive means of confinement be used, allowing confinement in an
individual’s home if possible.87 Furthermore, the penalty for noncompliance is only a
misdemeanor. It is arguable that the subsection of the medical treatment provision does comply
with the Jacobsen constitutional standard. While a civil monetary penalty does not implicate the
same rights as forced quarantine and isolation, the penalty measure upheld in Jacobsen was
nonetheless a misdemeanor designed to enforce the rest of the statute for public safety. Freedom
from bodily restraint is a fundamental interest and government actions that invade such a right

86

Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, Model
State Emergency Health Powers Act, Dec. 21, 2001.
87
Id.
24

must be reviewed with strict scrutiny.88 The Model Act’s treatment and testing powers, however,
are not triggered until a medical emergency is declared. While the emergency declaration power
itself raises constitutional issues (as mentioned earlier), it is still important that the authorities can
only exercise the power to detain individuals when a medical necessity exists and during a medical
emergency, where courts would most likely find a compelling state interest. Gostin explains that
the Model Act appropriately balances individual and communal rights because the broad
emergency powers are available only on a temporary basis, and only when reasonably necessary.
The quarantine and isolation powers are limited in time, scope and duration, and are therefore
narrowly tailored to the means of preventing or containing a health emergency. Only those that
pose a risk to others will be subjected to these powers, and the Model Act sufficiently protects
individual rights to contest those coercive government actions. 89
There are other aspects of the Model Act’s treatment and testing provisions that do not
comport with the Jacobsen constitutional standard for compulsory medical treatment. Unlike
Jacobsen, all authorities exercising the Model Act’s compulsory powers would be immune from
nearly all liability arising out of such actions. Under Section 804, “Neither the State, its political
subdivisions, nor, except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Governor, the
public health authority, or any other State or local official referenced in this Act, is liable for the
death of or any injury to persons, or damage to property, as a result of complying with or attempting
to comply with this Act or any rule or regulations promulgated pursuant to this Act during a state
of public health emergency.”90 Time sensitive emergencies will no doubt hinder the ability of
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healthcare providers to make an adequate determination of medical appropriateness in every case
before administering treatment, but to abandon the ordinary standard of care entirely encourages
the “arbitrary” use of compulsory medical treatment powers contrary to the constitutional
standards of Jacobsen, Without concern of being held liable for damages, health authorities will
be incentivized to treat as many individuals as possible without the appropriate determination of
medical appropriateness.
IV. Conclusion
Although a promising starting point to guide and encourage states to update their public
health infrastructure, the Model Act does not adequately balance individual rights against
government power and certain provisions must be modified before adoption into state law. 9/11
and the anthrax attacks alerted lawmakers to new problems. The United States was vulnerable, and
in a world of terror, the weaponization of fast spreading contagions posed modern threats that older
public health laws never considered. Some critics feel the Model Act is just a politically driven
and emotional reaction aimed at expanding the executive powers. However, I argue that the Model
Act is instead a good starting point towards resolving major problems mentioned earlier in this
paper: the lack of clarity in the roles and duties of healthcare actors and officials; the problem of
variation between state laws; and the outdated state of most current public health laws.
The conclusions of this research are intended to provide the public health practice
community with information on the trajectory of public health emergency law. While I agree with
the purpose of the Model Act and use of the Model Act to influence state reform, I assert that the
Model Act goes too far in expanding government authority, and should be modified to better
comport with the constitution and our democratic society.
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